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RECENT CASES
JURORS
IMPARTIALITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AS AFFECTED BY THE
LOYALTY ORDER
According to the recent opinion of the Supreme Court in Dennis v.
United States,' "a holding of implied bias to disqualify [government em-
ployed] jurors because of their relationship with the Government is no longer
permissible."'2 The effect of this decision upon the Sixth Amendment's
guaranty of "trial by impartial jury" merits consideration.
The propriety of allowing employees of the Government to serve on
juries when the United States is a party was first considered in 1908 in
Crawford v. United States.3 Charged with conspiring to defraud the gov-
ernment, the defendant challenged one juryman solely because he operated
a sub-postoffice. A denial of the challenge was held by the Supreme Court
to be error on the ground that the common law rule-which implies bias as a
matter of law against a servant juror when the master is a party- 4 was
equally applicable to governmental personnel.
Implied bias results from a relationship between a juror and a party which
experience dictates would, ordinarily lead to partiality.' The common law, it
is true, considered the employment relationship to be of this nature ;f but it is
1. 70 S. Ct. 519 (1950). Justice Minton wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice
Reed concurred specially; Justice Jackson concurred in an opinion which is discussed in
note 30 infra; Justices Frankfurter and Black dissented with separate opinions; Justices
Clark and Douglas did not participate in the decision.
Justice Frankfurter was concerned over the effect of the Dennis rule as an impair-
ment of the concept of fairness in the judicial process. Justice Black was concerned
more with the need to protect individual rights covered by the Sixth Amendment and he
felt the Dennis rule to be a violation of the constitutional mandate of jury impartiality.
The thesis of this note is substantially in accord with Justice Black's dissenting opinion.
Justice Douglas has since placed himself with the dissenters in the Dennis case.
Morford v. United States, 70 S. Ct. 586 (1950).
2. Id. at 523.
3. 212 U. S. 183 (1908).
4. 3 BL. Comm. * 363; 4 Id. * 352.
5. 3 BL. Commrs. * 363. The distinction between actual and implied bias of jurors was
developed at common law, and was recognized in the two forms of challenge allowed
against prospective jurors: principal and to the favour. The principal challenge was
allowed for kinship to a party, financial interest in the action, or close relationship--such
as employer-employee-with one, of the parties. In such cases bias was implied in law
and the challenged juror's disqualification was absolute. The challenge to the favour
merely presented grounds for suspicion of actual bias-such as acquaintanceship-and
resulted in a determination by triors of whether any bias in fact existed. If it did not,
the juror could serve. Ibid. These distinctions are generally unchanged in American
jurisdictions. See Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357 (1884).
6. 3 BL. Comm. * 363. For American cases see Miller v. United States, 38 App.
D.C. 361 (1912) ; Central R.R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173 (1879) ; Temples v. Central
of Ga. Ry., 15 Ga. App. 115, 82 S. E. 777 (1914); Pearce v. Quincy Mining Co., 149
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fairly clear also that the common law did not allow a challenge for implied
bias against an employee of the Crown.7 To the latter extent, therefore, the
Crawford case was based on weak authority. Yet, common law practice would
not be binding nor necessarily appropriate in this country in view of the
constitutional requirement of jury impartiality. The Sixth Amendment de-
mands at least a policy of exclusion of jurors with any questionable interest
in the controversy.' To effectuate this policy the Court formed the rule of the
Crawford case by analogy to situations in civil and criminal trials. It was
noted that the employer-employee relationship had been accepted as grounds
Mich. 112, 112 N. W. 739 (1907) ; Louisville Ry. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738, 2 So. 360 (1887) ;
Hufnagle v. Delaware & H. Co. 227 Pa. 476, 76 Atl. 205 (1910) ; State v. Thompson,
24 Utah 314, 67 Pac. 789 (1902).
The rule has commonly been extended to those who have a financial interest or are
employed by one who has a financial interest in the case. Evans v. State, 13 Ga. App. 700,
79 S. E. 916 (1913) ; Gaff v. State, 155 Ind. 277, 58 N. E. 74 (1900) ; Zimmerman v.
State, 115 Ind. 129, 17 N. E. 258 (1888) ; Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357 (1884) ; State v.
Golubski (Mo. App.) 45 S. W.2d 873 (1932).
7. Rex v. Hampden, 9 How. St. Tr. 1054 (K. B. 1684). Hampden, charged with
sedition, challenged for implied bias an officer of the King's Forest who was a prospective
juror. The Lord Chief Justice denied the challenge, saying, "It is no cause of challenge
even to be the King's tenant, and there is a great deal of reason for it. For if that were
a good cause of challenge, mark the consequences, then all persons that hold lands in
England, hold them mediately or immediately of the King, and so the King could have
no freeholders to be jurymen in his cause." Id. at 1058. The Attorney General also
pointed out that, "If all that receive salary or wages from the King are not to be jurymen
in the King's causes, then all the deputy lieutenants and militia officers which generally
are the most substantial freeholders, are excluded from being jurymen." Id. at 1059.
The questioned juror eventually was removed by agreement of counsel, as was
another who was a sergeant-at-arms of the King. But the Chief Justice remained firm
that they could not be removed by challenge:
Attorney General: . . . "for no reason that has been offered."
Chief Justice: "No, no, I do not hear anything of reason offered for it." Ibid.
Although Blackstone did not comment directly on the problem, he remains the strong-
est supporter of the contrary rule. His detailed discussion of jury challenges is pre-
sented in reference to civil actions at 3 BL. Cozitm. * 363. Respecting criminal trials,
however, he declares that challenges may be made "either on the part of the King, or on
that of the prisoner . . . for the very same reasons that they may be made in civil causes."
4 Id. * 352. This statement is supported by a reference to the judiciary's tendencies to
favor the Crown, and the apprehension arising from that fact. "More is to be appre-
hended from the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the Crown in suits between
the King and subject, than in disputes between one individual and another." 4 Id. * 349.
The same would manifestly be true of jurors whose livelihood comes from the King, and
there would be as much reason to fear the juror as the judge.
Two other commentators agree that the principal challenge might be allowed against
a menial servant of the King, a member of his livery, or an immediate tenant. 5 BACON's
ABRIDGMENT 355 (1876) ; Co. Lirr. * 156 a n.5. Hawkins disagrees, but concludes that
the problem is unsettled. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN c.43, § 33 (1824). Sur-
prisingly, it is said that a challenge to the favour should never be allowed against the
Crown, since everyone should favor the King by allegiance. BACON, supra; COKE, supra.
8. Notes, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 751 (1950) ; 11 TEmPLE L. Q. 430, 431 (1937). The
requirement even at common law and without the strength of a written constitution was
that a juror should be omne exceptione majoris. 4 BL. Comm. * 352. The common re-
statement of this rule is that a juror must be "indifferent as he stands unsworn."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
for imputing bias even where the employer was an impersonal entity-a
corporation.
But Government employees are not so apt to favor their employer as are
privately employed persons. The interest of the United States in the prosecu-
tion of ordinary criminal cases is somewhat less than that of a corporation or
other employer whose concern in most actions is both direct and immediate.
Likewise, the relationship of the Government employee with the Government
is more impersonal than that of the private employee with his employer; there
is, on the whole, less "pressure" on the former than on the latter. If these
differences are sufficient to serve as basis for the application of different
rules, then Congress could, in its discretion, overrule the Crawford decision.
In 1935 Congress did so. The Crawford rule had harsh consequences
in the District of Columbia. Since government employes were disqualified
as jurors in even the most minor criminal cases, other residents of the District
were burdened with additional jury service. To remedy this inequity a bill
was prepared to overrule the Crawford case. It declared that ". . . persons,
otherwise qualified according to law whether employed in the service of the
Government of the United States or of the District of Columbia . . .shaff
be qualified to serve as jurors in the District of Columbia and shall not be
exempt from such service .. ."1 The validity of this statute was immedi-
ately attacked in United States v. Wood." The defendant was charged with
petit larceny. Two of the jurors who convicted him were employed by the
Government and another was the recipient of a civil war pension. Challenges
for implied bias against all three were overruled. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that Congress could constitutionally remove the imputation of
bias recognized by the Crawford case without impairing the Sixth Amendment
9. Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 196 (1908). See e.g., Central R.R. Co.
v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173 (1879) ; Louisville Ry. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738, 2 So. 360 (1887);
State v. Thompson, 24 Utah 314, 67 Pac. 789 (1902):
10. D. C. CODE § 11-1420 (1940).. The bill was designed to bring about general im-
provements in the jury system of the District. 79 CONG..Rzc. 13, 401 (1935). It was
drafted by a committee appointed to investigate minor criminal prosecutions in the Dis-
trict, among whose members were the president of the District Bar Association and repre-
sentatives of many civic groups. Committee reports show that the purpose of the bill
was to eradicate a number of exemptions from jury service which had made the selection
of juries much more difficult. Among these was mentioned the exemption "by judicial
construction" which applied to all Government employees in criminal cases. H. R. REP.
No. 1421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; SEN. REP. No. 1297, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
For cases typifying the operation of the statute in ordinary criminal prosecutions
with which Congress was concerned, see: Weldo'n v. United States, 183 F.2d 832 (App.
D. C. 1950) (sodomy); Wright v. United States, 183 F.2d 821 (App. D. C. 1950)
(pandering) (both citing the Denis case) ; Higgins v. United States, 160 F.2d 222 (App.
D. C. 1946) (narcotics charge) ; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. District of Columbia, 89 F.2d
502 (App. D. C. 1937) (fraudulent weights and measures).
11. 299 U. S. 123 (1936), noted in 50 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1937) ; 27 3. CRI-m. L. &
CRIA. 914 (1937) ; 21 MINN. L. REv. 608 (1937) ; 11 TEMPLE L. Q. 430 (1937).
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mandate of trial by impartial jury. The prior disqualification was felt to be
"artificial and not necessary to secure impartiality."12
Again, in 1948, the validity of the statute was brought into question.
In Frazier v. United States,' the defendant was tried for violation of a nar-
cotics act by a jury composed entirely of Government employees. A blanket
challenge for implied bias was denied and the conviction affirmed on the
authority of the Wood case, the purport of which was said to be that ".
Government employees and persons privately engaged were put on the same
basis . . 411
But nowhere is there to be found any indication that Congress intended
to do more than remove the implied bias arising from the bare fact of govern-
ment employment. The statute was the nemesis only of the Crawford hold-
ing." Certainly the Wood and Frazier cases approved no more broad an
interpretation than this; for in Wood it was said:
We think that the imputation of implied bias simply by
virtue of governmental employment, without regard to any actual
partiality growing out of the nature and circumstances of particular
cases, rests on an assumption without any rational foundation ...
It is suggested that an employee of the government may be appre-
hensive of the termination of his employment in case he decides in
favor of the accused in a criminal case. Unless the suggestion be
taken to have reference to somne special and exceptional case, it seems
to us far-fetched and chimerical. . . . (emphasis added)."1
And in Frazier also the Court made a similar statement:
The effect of these rulings . . . was to make Government em-
ployees subject, as are all other persons and in the same manner, to
challenge for 'actual bias' and under all ordinary circumstances only
to such challenge. In that view, absent any basis for such challenge,
12. United States v. Wood, 299 U. S: 123, 148 (1936).
13. 335 U. S. 497 (1948), noted in 37 GEo. L. 3. 431 (1949) ; 28 NEB. L. REv. 446
(1949).
The defendant's hope for reversal here was predicated on the fact that after the Wood
decision a system grew up in the District which resulted almost inevitably in a substantial
portion of all jurors being government employees. Largely because of his own actions
in the trial court, the defendant was unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, but three Justices
joined with Tustice Jackson's condemnation of the system. See Frazier v. United States,
335 U. S. 497, 514 (1948) (dissenting opinion). The system had in fact been discontinued
before the Supreme Court considered the case. Comment, Justice, Jury Trials, and
Government Service, 35 CORN. L. Q. 814, 819 (1950).
This decision is also said to have extended the Wood.doctrine since employees of a
department directly interested in the prosecution of narcotics violations were held not to
be disqualified for implied bias. Note, 37 GEo. L. J. 431 (1949). This is true, but Frazier
remains a weak case on which to base an extension since it was apparent that the de-
fendant deliberately stacked his jury with government employees, apparently hoping to
increase his chances of reversal on appeal. The actions did not go unrecognized, how-
ever. Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497, 505 (1948).
14. Id. at 510.
15. See note 10 supra.
16. United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123, 149 (1936).
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we do not see how a right to challenge [for implied bias] . . . can
arise from the mere fact . . . of government [employment].
(emphasis added). 17
Further, it is proper to .question whether Congress has the power, con-
sistent with the spirit of the Sixth Amendment, to completely immunize gov-
ernment employees from challenge for implied bias. To do so would force
defendants to prove the existence of actual bias in every instarfce. Yet,
impartiality itself, or the want of it, is not susceptible of absolute proof. "It
is a state of mind.""8 In a close case the burden would be so great that there
would be little possibility of its successful accomplishment as to any substantial
number of jurors."9 And, since the Constitution was drafted at a time when
the two forms of challenge for bias were concretely embedded in the common
law, it would be arbitrary and unreasonable to abolish one form of challenge
as to a particular group of jurors while leaving others subject to such challenge.
The broad scope of the Sixth Amendment2" contains no license for such dis-
criminatory action. In light of these considerations, the narrow interpretation
put on the statute by Wood and Frazier seems both logical and constitutionally
proper.
But the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in the Dennis case,
where there was an attempt to show the existence of "special and exceptional"
circumstances which, under Wood and Frazier, might still allow an imputation
of bias against a Government-employed juror. Dennis, the general secretary
of the American Communist Party, was cited for contempt by the House of
Representatives for deliberate refusal to make an appearance before the
House Un-American Activities Committee in answer to a subpoena.21 At trial
in the District of Columbia, Dennis challenged all government employees on
the jury, asserting that as a result of President Truman's Loyalty Order2 2 they
would be fearful of casting a vote for acquittal of a notorious Communist.
23
17. Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497, 510 (1948).
18. See United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123, 145 (1936).
19. A defendant in this situation must therefore choose between a costly and time-
consuming voir dire examination or the silent acceptance of jurors whose indifference is
questionable. In cases of public concern, it is likely that extended voir dire, forced on
defendants by the Dennis rule, will operate to their detriment in public opinion by being
labelled "delaying tactics" and harassment of the judge. To emphasize this, one need only
call attention to the unanimity of public opinion against the eleven "top Communists" who
were recently convicted of Smith Act violations, and the extent of public comment on
their trial tactics.
20. U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . ..
21. H. Res. 193 (1947). For the rather lengthy debate on the Resolution, see 93
CoNG. REc. 3813 et. seq. (1947).
22. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947). The Order is also published
in an annotation to 5 U.S.C.A. § 631 (Supp. 1949).
23. Dennis is probably one of the best-known Communists in this country. As a
major leader of the party, he has made little effort to conceal his affiliations. In debate
on the Resolution, Representative Mundt called Dennis the number one or two Commun-
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The challenge was denied and the Supreme Court, in affirming his conviction,
held that the statute which abolished Crawford would not admit of any
exceptions.
24
The basis of Dennis' contention was the current mass hysteria against
Communists. Assuming the presence of such hysteria, however, it alone
furnishes no ground for distinguishing between an employee of the Govern-
ment and any other juror. Presumably both would be subject to the same
anti-Communist feelings. And although Congress did not have this situation
in mind when removing the Crawford rule,25 the import of Wood and Frazier
is that as to factors which affect all jurors ilike, Government employees
should stand on the same footing as other jurors.26 But Dennis' sword was
more pointed. The Government-employed juror, it was pointed out, was sub-
ject to extrinsic compulsion not to "associate" or be "sympathetic" with Com-
munists.2 7 It was argued that this action created pressure on the mind of a
government employee which would not be present in the mind of other jurors;
this Dennis asserted to be sufficient to remove the question from the area
covered by the statute and impute bias as a matter of law to those affected by
the loyalty order.
There is substantial merit in Dennis' arguments. The juror's livelihood
is represented by his Government employment; it is his source of income which
he is not anxious to jeopardize. In the typical criminal case he need not even
remotely consider the possibility of discharge because he votes for acquittal.
But where the employer has announced his intention to summarily discharge
employees having disloyal sympathies, 28 rare would be the employee-juror who
would not reflect on the consequences of acquitting a leader of the group
which the employer designated the most disloyal.2 9 It is no longer chimerical
ist in the United States. 93 CONG. REc. 3814 (1947). He has become even more widely
known as one of the eleven Communist Party leaders convicted in New York of violating
the Smith Act. See Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
24. See Dennis v. United States, 70 S. Ct. 519, 523 (1950).
25. See note 10 supra.
26. See Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497, 510 (1948).
27. These are the words of the Order itself. See Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG.
1935 (1947). See also note 29 infra.
28. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (App. D. C. 1950), presently under
consideration by the Supreme Court, 70 S. Ct. 1025 (1950).
29. It was recognized from the inception that the Loyalty program was directed
mainly against Communists and sympathizers in Federal employment. Agitation for
such a program came almost exclusively from those concerned over sympathy to Russia
or Communism. E.g., "Although they were not singled out in the order, Communists and
Communist sympathizers would be the first targets, it was indicated. There have been
repeated allegations in Congress that Communists held Federal posts." N. Y. Times,
March 23, 1947, p. 1, col. S.
It is not the purpose of this note to indict or excuse the loyalty program, hence no
lengthy discussion of its processes is undertaken here. Since most of the documents
concerned are still secret, discussion would be at best largely a matter of hearsay. But
that the loyalty program is actively directed against Communists and their cohorts, and
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to say that such a juror's impartiality is likely to be impaired. Nor can it be
said that the statute protects the juror in such a case unless it is argued that
the statute grants immunity from even well-founded challenges for implied
bias in specific cases. Such a declaration would clearly be an extension of
Wood and Frazier, and would be repugnant to the spirit of the Sixth Amend-
ment. The extrinsic pressures present in this case would be held to give
rise to implied bias in any non-governmentally employed juror against whom
they were directed; it is only circumstance that here they were directed toward
government employees. Thus the implied bias asserted here results from the
pressure, not the employment relationship.
The Supreme Court, rejecting in whole Dennis' contentions, characterized
the problem as one of carving out of the statute an exception for Commu-
nists ;3o rather than permit this, the Court foreclosed all exceptions. This
that the inquiries are thorough almost to the point of absurdity, are matters of common
knowledge.
It is relevant to consider that recent inroads on the secrecy of the juryroom have
resulted in almost complete loss of anonymity in deliberation and voting, at least in cases
of public concern. The outstanding example of this is the first trial of Alger Hiss for
perjury, in New York. The jury disagreed, and newspapers throughout, the country
publicized the names of the jurors and how they had voted on the case. Along with this
should be considered statements made on the floor of Congress to the effect that the
Attorney General should be impeached unless he obtained a speedy trial of Dennis, and
that nothing less than the maximum sentence would vindicate the Congressional affront
Dennis had committed. 93 CONG. RZc. 3815 (1947).Further, it should not seem surprising that officials of the loyalty program would
take cognizance of a government employee's participation in the acquittal of a person
such as Dennis. It may be assumed that a Communist or a sympathizer would favor
Dennis, a party official, in the face of even stern facts. Thus anyone who did so might
readily fall under suspicion. That such information may indeed be gathered and em-
ployed in the procedures under the loyalty program, see Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty
Among Government Employees, 58 YALE L. J. 1 (1948), especially at pp. 68-79. For an
enlightening controversy over this article, see the articles by J. Edgar Hoover and the
authors, Id. at 401 et seq.
Others have also emphasized that suspicion is sufficient to initiate investigations of
loyalty of government employees. ANDREWS, WASHINGTON WITcH HUNT 48, 95, 214
(1948). And it has been shown that no one, despite his past record or position, is free
from investigation once suspicion has attached. Id. at 74; Durr, The Loyalty Order's
Challenge to the Constitution, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 298, 303 (1949) : "The judges acquit
at their personal peril, for they themselves may be brought to account for their acquit-
tals. They are assigned the roles of judges but are accountable as prosecutors."
30. See Dennis v. United States, 70 S. Ct. 519, 523 (1950). Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion, Id. at 524, makes it clear that this characterization is his.
Justice Jackson's position in the Dennis case deserves comment. While announcing
adherence to his dissent in the Frazier case and his preparedness to overrule that "weird
and misguided" decision at any time, he voted to affirm Dennis' conviction on the ground
that an exception to the Frazier rule is uncalled for. The basis of Justice Jackson's dis-
sent in the Frazier case, however, is no longer available, since the system to which he
objected has been discontinued. See note 13"supra. Thus his latest objections to the
Frazier rule must be based on other grounds-in effect, constitutional ones. In this light,
his concurrence in the Dennis -ase seems, as an application of constitutional principles,
fundamentally unsound. For if the rule of the Frazier case is a constitutional infringe-
ment, application of the rule without exceptions where exceptions are permissible seems
tantamount to a declaration that one person's constitutional rights should be violated be-
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characterization was erroneous. Properly, the constitutionality of the statute
and its applicability to the usual criminal case could have been reaffirmed
without formulation of the Dennis rule. It was unnecessary to carve an excep-
tion to a statute which was inapplicable) and it was improper to hold that the
statute foreclosed a challenge for implied bias based on special circumstances
with which the statute was not concerned.
The Dennis case has extended the operation of the statute. Thus, the
danger of the case lies not in the decision but in its force as precedent, for
the opinion has foreclosed any question of implied bias imputable to govern-
ment employees. 31 In this, the case stands as more than a faulty job of
statutory construction. It represents a nebulous, almost stumbling infringe-
ment of an important constitutional right. Nor was the Court forced into this
position; Dennis' conviction could have been affirmed on the merits without
the formulation of such an unfair rule since voir dire showed that the jurors
were not in fact biased. 32 But the error, however made, still calls for correc-
cause another's have been before. Justice Jackson's basic concern, that Communists should
not be favored with an exception to a rule which applies to Republicans or Democrats,
is ably answered in Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion. Id. at 526.
31. Justice Reed's concurring opinion indicates his belief that the majority opinion
may be read to mean that implied bias may be found to disqualify government employees
when "circumstances are properly brought to the court's attention which convince the
court that Government employees would not be suitable jurors in a particular case" (em-
phasis added). That there is some basis for this position is shown by the facts discussed
in note 32 infra. This interpretation was not shared by any other member of the Court,
however. Dennis v. United States, 70 S. Ct. 519, 523 (1950).
32. This evaluation of the Dennis decision is made in light of two significant facts.
First, the offense with which Dennis was charged was one of which the proof is relatively
simple and the facts nearly indisputable. There would ordinarily be little room for jury
doubt in such a case. Second, the government employees who served as jurors in the
Dennis case were honestly, although erroneously, convinced that their Civil Service tenure
would protect them from the threats of the Loyalty Order. It is likely therefore that
they were not in fact subject to prejudice because of the Order.
E.g., from the voir dire examination of two jurors:
Q. You are familiar with the Government loyalty oath investigation?
A. I believe I am. I have heard something of it.
Q. Do you feel that rendering a verdict of not guilty in this case, if you come to
that conclusion, it would stop you, any criticism or embarassment among your fellow
employees?
A. None whatsoever . . .
Q. You would not have any thought that would be taken as evidence of friendliness
to communism?
A. No; I am not worried'about my job that way.
Q. Now . . . you have heard, have you, of the loyalty test or loyalty investigation
which is going on to test the loyalty of government employees? . . .
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Are you aware of the fact that one of the tests that might disqualify or prevent
you from Government employment is friendly association with any Communist person or
any Communist organizations?
A. That would not. I am a Civil Service employee. I have taken an examination
for my job.Q. . . . Are you aware of the fact that, despite any Civil Service protection, still
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tion. The remedy seems clear: the Dennis case should be overruled. 33
a finding that you were in friendly association with any Communist or Communist organi-
zation would render you ineligible to continue in your Government position?
A. It would not.
Q. What?
A. It would not.
See Dennis v. United States, 70 S. Ct. 519, 522 n.4 (1950).
In light of these facts, any court might be reluctant to reverse an apparently sub-
stantial conviction.
33. Failing this, the concept of a fair trial demands that discretion to determine
actual bias should be exercised liberally in favor of defendants at the trial level. This
suggestion is not new. It was made, omnisciently, in United States v. Wood, 299 U. S.
123, 149-150 (1936) : "But when we consider the range of offenses and the general run
of criminal prosecution, it is apparent that [such] cases of special interest would be ex-
ceptional. The law permits full inquiry as to actual bias in any such circumstances.
. . . We must assume that the courts of the District, with power fully adequate to the
occasion, will be most careful in those special instances, where circumstances suggest that
any actual partiality may exist, to safeguard the just interests of the accused."
